Authorization algorithms for permission-role assignments by Sun, Lili et al.
Authorization Algorithms for Permission-Role 
Assignments  
 
 
Lili Sun, Hua Wang, Jianming Yong 
(University of Southern Queensland, Queensland, Australia 
{sun, wang, yong}@usq.edu.au) 
 
 
 
Abstract: Permission-role assignments (PRA) is one important process in Role-based access 
control (RBAC) which has  been proven to be a flexible and useful access model for 
information sharing in distributed collaborative environments.  However, problems may arise 
during the procedures of PRA. Conflicting permissions may assign to one role, and as a result, 
the role with the permissions can derive unexpected access capabilities. 
This paper aims to analyze the problems during the procedures of permission-role assignments 
in distributed collaborative environments and to develop authorization allocation algorithms to 
address the problems within permission-role assignments.   The algorithms are extended to the 
case of PRA with the mobility of permission-role relationship.  Finally, comparisons with other 
related work are discussed to demonstrate the effective work of the paper. 
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1 Introduction  
Information security currently has vast impact to information industry, but also to 
individuals and our daily life [Bella, 2008, Chen et al. 2008]. Access control, as a 
significant method to secure the information in distributed environments, has been 
studied by many researchers [Harrer et al. 2008, Wang et al. TKDE].  The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology developed the role-based access control 
(RBAC) prototype [Feinstein H. L. 1995] and published a formal model [Ferraiolo 
and Kuhn 1992]. RBAC has been widely used in database system management and 
distributed environments since it enables managing and enforcing security in large-
scale and enterprise-wide systems.  RBAC involves individual users being associated 
with roles as well as roles being associated with permissions (Each permission is a 
pair of objects and operations). As such, a role is used to associate users and 
permissions. A user in this model is a human being. A role is a job function or job 
title within the organization associated with authority and responsibility. 
Permission is an approval of a particular operation to be performed on one or 
more objects.  As shown in Figure 1, the relationships between users and roles, and 
between roles and permissions are many-to-many (i.e. a permission can be associated 
with one or more roles, and a role can be associated with one or more permissions).  
Recently, role based access control (RBAC) has been widely used in database 
system management and operating system products since its management advantages 
[Wang et al. 2003ADC]. In 1993, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) developed prototype implementations, sponsored external research [Feinstein 
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H.L. 1995], and published formal RBAC models [Ferraiolo and Kuhn 1992]. Many 
organizations prefer to centrally control and maintain access rights, not so much at the 
system administrator's personal discretion but more in accordance with the 
organization's protection guidelines [David et al. 1993]. RBAC  is being considered as 
part of the emerging SQL3 standard for database management systems, based on their 
implementation in Oracle 7 [Sandhu R. 1997]. Many  RBAC practical applications  
have been implemented [Barkley et al. 1999, Ferraiolo et al. 1999, Sandhu R. 1998, 
Wang et al. ACSC04, Wang et al. TSMC]. 
 
 
Figure 1: RBAC relationship 
However, there is a consistency problem when using RBAC management. For 
instance, if there are hundreds of permissions and thousands of roles in a system, it is 
very difficult to maintain consistency because it may change the authorization level, 
or imply  high-level confidential information to be derived when more than one 
permission is requested and granted.  
The permissions assigned to a role by administrators may conflict. For example, 
the permission for approving a loan in a bank is conflicting with the permission of 
funding a loan.  These two permissions cannot be assigned to a role; however, 
because of role hierarchies, a role may still have these permissions  even if they have 
been revoked from the role. In the latter case, a user with this role is able to access 
objects in the permission and has operations on the objects. There are evident 
problems with the processes of assigning and revocation.  
Authorization granting problem -- How to check whether a permission is in 
conflict with the permissions of a role? 
Authorization revocation problem -- How to find whether permissions of a role 
have been revoked from the role or not?  
For example, Figure 2 shows a system administrative role ( BankSO ) in a bank to 
manage regular roles such as AUDITOR, TELLER, ACCOUNT_REP and 
MANAGER. Role MANAGER inherits AUDITOR and TELLER. ACCOUNT_REP 
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has a SSD relationship with AUDITOR as well as DSD relationship with TELLER 
[Wang et al. TKDE].  
The administrative role BankSO can assign audit permission or cash operation 
permission to a role but not both, otherwise it compromises the security of a bank 
system.  Our aim is to provide relational algebra algorithms to solve the problems and 
then automatically check conflicts when assigning and revoking. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Administrative role and role Relationships in a bank 
Based on the database and its tables such as ROLES, SEN-JUN  in the paper 
[Wang et al. 2003ADC],   this paper is going to develop formal approaches to check 
the conflicts and thereby help allocate the permissions without compromising the 
security. The formal approaches are based on relational structure and relational 
algebra operations.  To my knowledge,   this is the first attempt in this area to develop 
formal approaches for permission allocation and conflict detection. 
     
RoleName MANAC AUDC ACCOUNT_REPC TELLERC 
MANAGER 0 0 0 0 
AUDITOR -1 0 -1 -1 
ACCOUNT_REP -1 -1 0 -1 
TELLER -1 -1 -1 0 
Table 1:  The relation ROLES in Figure 2 
The ROLES relation in Figure 2 is in Table 1. The attribute TELLERC shows 
whether the role TELLER is conflicting with the RoleName in the relation or not.  For 
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instance, in the third tuple, a user with role TELLER has conflicts with the role 
AUDITOR.   
SEN-JUN - This is a relation of roles in a system. Senior is the senior of the two 
roles.  Table 2 expresses the SEN-JUN relationship in Figure 2.   
 
 
Senior Junior 
MANAGER AUDITOR 
MANAGER TELLER 
TELLER BANK 
AUDITOR BANK 
 
Table 2: SEN-JUN  in Figure 2         Table 3: An example of the relation PERM 
 
The new tables like PERM  and ROLE_PERM are needed. PERM - This  is a 
relation of  {PermName, Oper, Object, ConfPer}:  
PermName is the primary key for the table, and is the name of the permission in the 
system.   
Oper is the name of the operation granted. It has information about the object that 
the operation is granted on.   
Object is the database item that can be accessed by the operation. It can be a 
database, a table, a view, an index or a database package.  
ConfPer is a set of permissions that conflicts with the PermName in the relation. 
For example, a staff member in a bank cannot have both permissions of approval and 
funding as well as both permissions of audit and teller. The relation of PERM can be 
expressed as Table 3.  
ROLE-PERM - is a relationship between the  ROLES and the  PERM, listing what 
permissions are granted to  what roles. It has two attributes:   
RoleName  is a foreign key RoleName from the table ROLES.   
PermName  is a foreign key PermName from the table PERM which is assigned to 
the role. 
    Suppose the permission Approval is assigned to role TELLER and the permission 
Funding to role MANAGER, Table 4 expresses the permission-role relationship.   
 
RoleName PermName 
MANAGER Funding   
TELLER   Approval 
           
               Table 4: ROLE-PERM                   Table 6: Example of Can-revokep 
 
Based on these relations, we describe the Authorization granting algorithm and 
revocation algorithms in this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. We recall the relational algebra-based 
authorization granting and revocation algorithms developed in our previous work. The 
extensions of the algorithms are described in section 3. Comparisons to related work 
are discussed in section 4 and the conclusions are in section 5. 
PermName Oper Object ConfPerm 
Approval approve Cash/check Funding 
Funding invest cash Approval 
Audit audit record Teller 
Teller transfer cash Audit 
Admin.role Role Range 
BankSO [Bank, MANAGER) 
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2 Authorization granting and revocation algorithms for PRA 
We recall granting and revocation algorithms for PRA based on relational algebra in 
this section. Details can be found from [Wang et al. 2003ADC].  
The notion of a Prerequisite conditionp, Can-assignp and Can-revokep 
mentioned in the paper is a key part in the processes of permission_role assignment.  
The Prerequisite conditionp is used to test whether or not  permission can be assigned 
to roles while the Can-assignp is used to verify what role range's permissions an 
administrator can assign.    
For a given set of roles R let CR denote all possible prerequisite conditions that 
can be formed using the roles in R. Not every administrator can assign permission to a 
role.  The relation of Can-assignp ⊆  AR ×CR  × 2R  provides what permissions can 
be assigned by administrators with prerequisite conditions, where AR is a set of 
administrative roles.  
Permission-role assignment (PA) is authorized by Can-assignp relation. Table 5 
shows the Can-assignp relations with the prerequisite conditions in the example. 
 
Admin.role Prereq.ConditionP Role Range 
BankSO   BANK ∧ TELLER ∧  AUDITOR  [ACCOUNT_REP, ACCOUNT_REP]   
BankSO BANK ∧ TELLER ∧ PACCOUNT_RE  [AUDITOR, AUDITOR] 
BankSO BANK ∧ AUDITOR ∧ PACCOUNT_RE  [TELLER,TELLER] 
Table 5: Can-assignp relation in Figure 2 
Supposing an administrator role ADrole wants to assign a permission pj to a role r 
with a set of permissions P.  P* is an extension of P,  
P*  = {p | p ∈  P } ∪ {p | exist r' ∈   R, r'<r,  (p, r') ∈  PA }.  There are two major 
steps in the following permission granting algorithm.  The first step is to check 
whether the ADrole can assign the permission  pj to r or not.  The set of Prerequisite 
conditionp associated with ADrole can be obtained from the table Can-assignp while 
the set of roles associated with permission pj is obtained from the table ROLE-PERM.  
The ADrole can build the membership of permission pj and role r only if there is a 
role in the both sets.  This means permission pj  satisfies prerequisite condition.  The 
second step is to determine whether the permission  pj  conflicts  with the permissions 
of r  or not,  in other words,  whether pj  conflicts with permission set P* or not.  The 
set of conflicting permissions of pj can be retrieved from table PERM.  Permission pj 
is conflicting with role r if the intersection of the set and P* is not empty. 
There are related subtleties that arise in RBAC concerning the interaction 
between granting and revocation of permission-role membership. A relation Can-
revokep ⊆  AR × 2R provides which permissions in what role range can be revoked. 
Table 6 gives an example of the Can-revokep relation. We have two revocation 
algorithms, one is a weak revocation algorithm that is for explicit member of a role 
only, the other one is a strong revocation algorithm that is used to delete explicit 
memberships between permissions and roles as well as implicit memberships.   
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The meaning of Can-revokep(BankSO, [Bank, MANAGER)) in Table 6 is that a 
member of the administrative role BankSO can revoke the membership of a 
permission from any role in [Bank, MANAGER). 
Two algorithms were developed for revocation of a permission pj from a role r by 
an administrative role ADrole. In the weak revocation approach, only whether or not 
permission pj is an explicit member of role r needs to be determined. Operation of the 
weak revocation has no effect when the permission pj is not an explicit member of the 
role r. The role set associated with pj is gained from the relation of ROLE-PERM 
while the role set of role range with ADrole is obtained from the relation Can-
revokep. The permission pj can be revoked if the intersection of these two role sets is 
not empty.  
A role still owns a permission of a system, which has been weakly revoked, if the 
role is senior to another role associated with the permission. To solve the 
authorization revocation problem, we need strong revocation, which requires 
revocation of both explicit and implicit membership. Strong revocation of a 
permission's membership in role r requires that  the permission be removed not only 
from explicit membership in r, but also from explicit and implicit membership in all 
roles junior to r. Strong revocation therefore has a cascading effect up-wards in the 
role hierarchy. The first step in the strong revocation algorithm is to test whether  pj is 
in P* or not.  If the test is negative, that means pj is neither an explicit member nor an 
implicit member of the role r. When this case occurs, the strong revocation has no 
effect for the role. Otherwise, pj is either an explicit member or an implicit member of 
r.  In this step, the membership of pj  is revoked from r if pj  ∈  P;  then the role set of 
roles that are junior to role r can be retrieved from the relation SEN-JUN.   For all 
roles in both the set and P, the relationships between these roles and permission pj are 
revoked.  
3 Extensions of the algorithms with mobility of permissions 
Similar to the mobility of user-role relationship, permissions can also be assigned to 
roles as mobile and immobile members [Wang et al. ACSC2005].  There are four 
kinds of permission-role membership for a given role x [Sandhu and Munnwer 1999, 
Wang et al. Special]. 
 
1:  Explicit Mobile Member EMPx: EMPx = {p,  (p, Mx) ∈  PA}  
2:  Explicit Immobile Member EIMPx: EIMPx = {p,  (p, IMx) ∈  PA}  
3:  Implicit Mobile Member ImMPx: ImMPx = {p,  ∃  x'<x,  (p, Mx') ∈  PA}   
4:  Implicit Immobile Member ImIMPx: ImIMPx = {p, ∃  x'<x, (p, IMx') ∈  PA}   
 
A prerequisite conditionPM is evaluated for a permission p by interpreting role x 
to be true if   
p∈  EMx ∨  (p ∈  ImMx  ∧   p ∉EIMx) 
and x  to be true if  
p∉  EMx ∧   p ∉  EIMx ∧   p ∉  ImMx ∧   p ∉  ImIMx 
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In other words x denotes mobile membership (explicit or implicit) and  x  
denotes absence of any kind of membership.   
For a given set of roles R let CR denote all possible prerequisite conditions with 
mobility of permission-role relationship that can be formed using the roles in R. Not 
every administrator can assign a role to a user. The following relations provide what 
permissions an administrator can assign as mobile members or immobile members 
with prerequisite conditions.   
Can-assignp-M is a relation of AR × CR × 2R,  which is used for permission-role 
assignments with mobile members;  where AR is a set of administrative roles. 
Permission-role assignments with immobile members are authorized by the relation 
Can-assignp-IM  ⊆  AR × CR × 2R.   
Permission-role assignment (PA) is authorized by Can-assignp-M and Can-
assignp-IM relations. Table 7 and Table 8 shows the Can-assignp-M and Can-
assignp-IM relations with the prerequisite conditions in the bank example. 
 
Admin.role Prereq.ConditionPM Role Range 
BankSO   BANK [BANK, BANK]   
BankSO BANK ∧ TELLER  [AUDITOR, AUDITOR] 
BankSO BANK ∧ AUDITOR  [TELLER, TELLER] 
Table 7: Can-assignp-M in the example 
Admin.role Prereq.ConditionPM Role Range 
BankSO   BANK [BANK, BANK]   
BankSO BANK ∧ TELLER  [AUDITOR, AUDITOR] 
BankSO BANK ∧ AUDITOR  [TELLER, TELLER] 
Table 8: Can-assignp-IM in the example 
The meaning of Can-assignp-M(BankSO, BANK, TELLER, AUDITOR) is that a 
member of the administrative role BankSO can assign a permission whose current 
membership satisfies the prerequisite condition BANK to be a mobile member of roles 
TELLER and AUDITOR..    
 Supposing an administrator role ADrole wants to assign a permission pj to role r  
with a set of permissions P which has  mobile and immobile memberships with r.   
The pj has mobile or immobile membership with r if ADrole can assign without 
conflicts.  The following algorithm applies to both of mobile and immobile members.      
P* is an extension of P, P* = {p | p ∈  P } ∪ {p | ∃  r' ∈   R, r' < r,  (p, r') ∈  PA}. 
 
Authorization granting algorithm 
GrantMP(ADrole, P, pj) 
Input: ADrole, role r and a permission pj. 
Output: true if ADrole can assign the permission pj to r with no conflicts; false 
otherwise. 
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Begin:  
Step 1. /* Whether the ADrole can assign the permission pj to r as mobile or 
immobile member or not} */ 
     Suppose SM1 = SM ∩  R and  SIM1 = SIM ∩  R  where  
     SM = Π Prereq.ConditionPM ( σ admin.role = ADrole (Can-assignp-M)) 
 
     SIM = Π Prereq.ConditionPM ( σ admin.role = ADrole (Can-assignp-IM)) 
 
     R = Π RoleName(σ PermName = pj (ROLE-PERM)) 
 
if  pj is an mobile member of r  and   SM1 φ≠ ,  
then  there exists role $ r1 ∈  SM1, such that 
         r1 ∈ Π Role Range (σ {ADrole, r}(Can-assign-M)), and (pj, r ∈PA ) 
        /* pj is in the range to be assigned as a mobile member by ADrole in 
        Can-assignp-M  */  
 
If pj is  an immobile member of r  and  SIM1 φ≠ , 
then there exists role  ri ∈  SIM1, such that 
         ri ∈ Π Role Range (σ {ADrole, r}(Can-assign-IM)), and (pj, r ∈PA ) 
go to step 2   
/* pj  is in the range to be assigned as an immobile member by ADrole in Can-assign-
IM  */  
 
else  
return false and stop.  
/* the admini.role has no right to assign the role ri as a mobile or immobile member to 
R */   
 
Step 2. /* whether the permission pj is conflicting with permissions of r or not */    
 
Let  
ConfPermS = Π ConfPerm (σ PermName = pj (PERM)) 
/* It is the conflicting permission set of the permission pj */  
 
if  ConfPermS ∩  P* φ≠ , 
then  
return false; /* pj  is a conflicting permission with role r */   
 
else 
return true. /* pj is not a conflicting permission with r */                                             ◊ 
  
This algorithm provides a way to decide  whether a permission can be assigned  
to a role as mobile or immobile member.   For mobile member, SM1  cannot be empty, 
and for immobile member, SIM1  cannot be empty. 
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Theorem 1: The authorization granting algorithm can prevent conflicts when 
assigning a permission to a role with mobile and immobile memberships.  
Proof Assuming an administrator role ADrole wants to assign a permission pj as a 
mobile member to a role which associates with a permission set P.  Step 1 in the 
algorithm has checked whether the ADrole can assign  pj as a mobile member to the 
role or not,  and the second step has decided whether the permission pj  conflicts with 
permissions  in P* or not. Indeed, pj can be assigned to the role if for all pi ∈  P* ,  pi  
is not in the conflicting permission set of  pj. Otherwise pj is a conflicting permission 
with P*.                                                                                                                           ◊ 
Similar to the time complexity analysis in the last section, we have the following 
corollary.  
 
Corollary 1: The authorization granting algorithm has time complexity O(n2) for 
the case of  n roles in a system. 
 Now we consider revocation of permission-role membership. Similar to Can-
assignp-M and Can-assignp-IM relations in  granting a permission to a role, there are   
Can-revokep-M and Can-revokep-IM  relations.    
Relations Can-revokep-M ⊆  AR × CR × 2R and Can-revokep-IM ⊆  AR × CR × 2R 
show which role range of mobile membership and immobile membership 
administrative roles can revoke respectively, where AR is a set of administrative roles. 
The meaning of Can-revokep-M (ShopSO, SHOP, [SHOP, MANAGER)) in 
Table 9 is that a member of the administrative role ShopSO can revoke mobile 
membership of a permission from any role in [SHOP, MANAGER) subject to the 
prerequisite condition SHOP. Can-revokep-IM is similar with respect to immobile 
membership. 
 
Admin.role Prereq.ConditionPRM Role Range 
ShopSO SHOP [SHOP, MANAGER) 
Table 9: Can-revokep-M 
The evaluation of a prerequisite condition for the revoke model is different from the 
grant model. In the revoke model a prerequisite conditionPRM is evaluated for a 
permission p by interpreting  role x to be true if  
p∈  EMx ∨  p ∈  EIMx ∨   p ∈  ImMx ∨  p ∈  ImIMx 
and x  to be true if  
p∉  EMx ∧   p ∉  EIMx ∧   p ∉  ImMx ∧   p ∉  ImIMx 
 
Due to role hierarchy, a role x' has all permissions of role x when x'>x. A user 
with two roles {x', x} still has the permissions of x if only to revoke  x  from the user. 
To solve the authorization revocation problem along with mobility of permission, we 
need to revoke the explicit member of a permission first if a role is an explicit 
member, then revoke the implicit member.  
Following are two algorithms for revocation of a permission pj as mobile or 
immobile members from a set of permission P by an administrative role ADrole, 
where P is a set of permissions which are assigned to a role r. The first one is the 
1790 Sun L., Wang H., Yong J.: Authorization Algorithms ...
weak revocation algorithm and the second is the strong revocation algorithm. The 
weak revocation only revokes explicit mobile and immobile memberships from r and 
does not revoke implicit mobile and immobile memberships but the strong revocation 
revokes both explicit and implicit mobile and immobile members. The structure of the 
weak revocation algorithm is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Weak revocation Algorithm 
Weak_revokeMP(ADrole, r, pj) 
Input: ADrole, a roles r and a permission pj. 
Output: true if ADrole can weakly revoke role pj from r; false otherwise. 
Begin: 
If  pj∉  P= {p | (p,r) ∈  PA},  
 
return false; /* there is no effect with the operation  of the  weak revocation since the 
permission pj is not an explicit member of the role r */ 
 
else  /* pj is an explicit member of  r, either an mobile member or immobile member 
*/   
    Case1:  pj  is an mobile  member of r,  
                 Roleswithpj = Π RoleName (σ PermName = pj (ROLE-PERM))  
                 /* Roles with permission pj */ 
                 PreM = Π Prereq.ConditionPRM(σ {admin.role = ADrole}(Can-revokep-M)) 
                 /* Prerequisite condition with ADRole */  
 
                 if  RP= Roleswithpj ∪   PreM φ≠  
                 RevokeRangeM  = Π Role Range(σ admin.role = ADrole(Can-revokep-M)) 
                 if   RR = Roleswithpj ∪   RevokeRangeM φ≠ ,    
                 return, true.  
                  /* the mobile member pj is revoked  */ 
 
                 else  
                 return false;  
                 /* the mobile member pj cannot be  revoked since the  role r is not in the  
                 role range to be revoked */  
                 else  
                 return  false and stop.  
                 /* The pj does not satisfy the prerequisite conditions */ 
 
    Case 2: if pj is an immobile  member of  r 
                 PreIM = Π Prereq.ConditionPRM(σ {admin.role = ADrole}(Can-revokep-IM)) 
                 /*  Prerequisite condition with ADRole */  
                 if  RPI= Roleswithpj ∩   PreIM φ≠  
                 RevokeRangeIM  = Π Role Range(σ admin.role = ADrole(Can-revokep-IM)) 
                 if RRI= Roleswithpj ∩   RevokeRangeIM φ≠ , 
                 return true,   
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                 /* the immobile member pj is revoked */ 
 
                 else   
                 return false ;  
                 /* the immobile member pj cannot be revoked */ 
 
                 else 
                 return  false and stop. 
                 /* The pj does not satisfy the perrequisite conditions */                             ◊ 
 
The weak revocation algorithm can be used to check whether an administrator 
can weakly revoke mobile and immobile memberships from roles or not. We have the 
following result with the weak revocation algorithm.  
   
 
Figure 3: Structure of weak revocation algorithm for permission 
Theorem 2: A permission  pj as mobile or immobile member is revoked by the 
weak revocation algorithm Weak_revoke(ADrole, r, pj) if the permission is an explicit 
member of role r and the ADrole has the right to revoke pj from the Can-revoke-M 
and Can-revoke-IM  relations.                                                                       ◊ 
 
A role still owns a permission of a system, which has been weakly revoked, if the 
role is senior to another role associated with the permission. To solve the 
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authorization revocation problem, we need strong revocation, which requires 
revocation of both explicit-implicit membership and mobile-immobile memberships.  
Strong revocation of a permission's membership in role r requires that the permission 
be removed not only from explicit mobile and immobile membership in r, but also 
from explicit,  and implicit mobile and immobile membership  in all roles junior to r.  
 
Strong revocation algorithm 
 Strong_revoke(ADrole, r, pj) 
Input: ADrole, a role r and a permission pj. 
Output: true, if it can strong revoke the permission pj from r; false otherwise. 
Begin:  
If pj∉  P*,  
return false;  
 
/* there is no effect of the strong revocation since the permission is not an explicit  
and implicit member of the role r */ 
 
else,  
    Case 1. if  pj ∈  P, do Weak_revoke(ADrole, r, pj);  
                /* pj is weakly revoked from r as mobile or immobile */; 
 
    Case 2. Suppose  
                 Jun = Π  Junior (σ {Senior=r }( SEN-JUN)),  
                 for all y ∈Jun ∩  P $,  
                 if pj ∈  R is a mobile member of the role y, do 
                 Weak_revoke(ADrole, y, pj) as   pj∈  EMy;    
                 if pj ∈  R is a immobile member of the role y, do  
                 Weak_revoke(ADrole, y, pj) as  pj∈  EIMy;    
                  /* the permission  pj is weakly revoked from all such y ∈  Jun ∩  P */.  
 
If all the weak revocation s are successful,   
return true; 
otherwise,  
return false.  
/* if one weak revocation cannot  finish*/                                          ◊ 
 
We have the following consequence.  
Theorem 3: The explicit mobile and immobile and implicit mobile and immobile 
members of role pj are revoked from  a role by the Strong revocation algorithm 
Strong_revoke(ADrole, r, pj) if the ADrole has the right to revoke pj from the Can-
revokep-M and Can-revokep-IM relations. 
Corollary 2:  The authorization revocation problem is solved by the Weak 
revocation algorithm and Strong revocation algorithm.  
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4 Related work 
There are several other related works on the security of relational databases [Chu and 
Tseng, 2008, Yang et al. 2008, Osborn et al. 1996]. 
The interaction between RBAC and relational databases are presented in [Osborn 
et al. 1996]. Two experiments are described. One is a role-based front end to a 
relational database with discretionary access control. The other is a role graph to show 
the roles in a standard relational database. Some relational concepts like roles, users 
and permissions are provided. Our model also supports such concepts even though it 
has a large variety. However, the main difference between our algorithms and the 
scheme in [Osborn et al. 1996] is that we focus on the solutions of the conflicts of 
roles and permissions, and the latter focuses on the correlation of RBAC with 
discretionary access controls. Their work discusses the relationship between roles and 
discretionary access controls, they do not address the allocation of permissions to 
roles without conflicts. In our work, we developed detailed algorithms for allocating 
roles and permissions and checking their conflicts. 
An architecture for the integration of tutoring approaches and process scaffolds 
into existing collaborative applications have been developed by Harrer et al. [2008]. 
The architecture allows to combine existing research on explicit representations of 
collaborative learning processes with the availability of existing and tested 
collaborative learning environments, but also to control the learning environments and 
thus enables adaptation of the tools to the current state of the learning process.  Their 
work is different from the work in this paper. We focus on the possible conflicts  in 
the permission assignments with role-based access model while they developed an 
architecture for adoption existing tools. 
An oracle implementation for permission-role assignment has been proposed in 
[Sandhu and Bhamidipati1998]. In [Sandhu and Bhamidipati1998], the difference 
between permission-role assignment and Oracle database management system was 
analyzed. Furthermore, through prerequisite conditions, the paper has demonstrated 
how to use Oracle stored procedures for implementation. However, the work in this 
chapter substantially differs from that proposal. Differences are due to the consistency 
problem that arises in [Sandhu and Bhamidipati1998]: 
It is very difficult to keep the consistency by reflecting security requirements 
between global network objects and local network objects if there are hundreds of 
roles and thousands of users in a system. 
This problem is completely overcome in our algorithms because the algorithms 
focus on the conflicts between roles and permissions. The authorization granting 
algorithms are used to find conflicts and prevent some secret information from being 
derived while the strong revocation algorithms are used to check whether a role still 
has permissions of another role.  
5 Conclusions  
This paper has provided new authorization allocation algorithms for mobility of 
permission-role assignments that are based on relational algebra operations. They are 
the authorization granting algorithm, weak revocation algorithm, and strong 
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revocation algorithm. The algorithms can automatically check conflicts when granting 
more than one permission to a role in a system.  They can prevent users associated 
with roles from accessing unauthorized use of facilities when the permissions of the 
roles are changed within the organization and demand the modification of security 
rights. The permissions can be allocated without compromising the security in RBAC 
and provide secure management for systems. For better understanding, a bank 
example is adopted in the paper to explain the ideas of mobile members, immobile 
members, roles and users. Finally, we have discussed the related work in this area.  
The future work will be the development of a system management with XML 
which involves the role-based group delegation subsystem. 
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